For years, the Mariners suffered from a combination of poor coaching, bad trades, and mismanagement of prospects and finances. This led to a 20-year playoff drought from 2002 to 2021. However, hope had returned. The streak was broken in 2022, and by 2024, the Mariners appeared poised for success with a roster full of stars.
Scott Servais, who had received Manager of the Year votes in 2022, remained at the helm, signaling consistency and leadership. The front office made several bold moves, trading for 2B Jorge Polanco, RP Gregory Santos, and OF Luke Raley—moves that were widely praised. They also acquired DH/C Mitch Garver, fresh off a World Series victory with the Rangers, while offloading bad contracts like those of Robbie Ray and Marco Gonzales.
At the heart of the Mariners’ optimism was their young core: Julio Rodriguez, George Kirby, Logan Gilbert, Cal Raleigh, Bryce Miller, Bryan Woo, Andres Munoz, and JP Crawford—players who had grown into stars under the team’s development system. The balance seemed right: young talent, veteran leadership (Mitch Haniger, Luis Castillo, Ryne Stanek), and breakout candidates like Woo, Miller, and Dominic Canzone. Role players like Dylan Moore, Tayler Saucedo, and Josh Rojas added depth to a promising roster.
Despite all these ingredients, the Mariners fell short of expectations. They finished with an 85-77 record—a fourth consecutive winning season, an unprecedented feat in franchise history—but it felt like a hollow achievement. For the 22nd time in 23 seasons, the Mariners missed the playoffs.
So, what went wrong?
Statistically, the Mariners were not a bad team in 2024. They ranked among the top 10 teams in baseball by many metrics. They led the MLB in team ERA at 3.49 and ranked 12th in wRC+ (a stat adjusting for ballpark effects and measuring total offensive production). Their run differential of +69 suggested they should have finished with a better record—an expected 89-73 mark, which would have secured them a playoff spot.
But two key statistics told a different story: batting average and strikeout percentage. The Mariners ranked 29th in batting average with a dismal .224, only slightly better than the White Sox. Modern analytics downplay batting average in favor of metrics like home runs and walks, but getting hits still matters. The Mariners walked often (fourth-most in the league), but they struggled to turn those walks into extra bases, ranking 27th in doubles and 29th in triples.
Strikeouts were an even bigger issue. Seattle struck out 26.8% of the time, tying the Rockies for the highest K% in baseball. The Mariners’ offensive philosophy of “controlling the zone” seemed to backfire. While this approach worked well for their pitchers, it led to excessive caution at the plate. Seattle hitters often watched strikes go by, leading the league in strikeouts looking. Instead of making contact or fouling off close pitches, they found themselves falling behind in the count, making it harder to recover in at-bats.
This passive approach was particularly costly in critical moments. The Mariners struggled with situational hitting—advancing runners and producing outs that moved runners into scoring position. This failure was magnified in close games, where Seattle often lost by just one run. Their inability to play “small ball” and capitalize on opportunities was a major factor in their underperformance.
Inconsistent offensive production was another problem. While the Mariners could score in bursts—blowing out opponents with eight-plus runs in some games—they often followed these outbursts with multiple low-scoring losses. This feast-or-famine offense made it difficult for them to win series consistently, even if they outscored their opponents overall.
Day games and matchups against weaker opponents also proved to be their undoing. Seattle lost eight games to the lowly Angels and dropped series to other sub-.500 teams like the Marlins, Athletics, and Nationals. They were 5-1 against the Tigers, who edged them out for the final playoff spot in the American League. These losses may reflect a lack of motivation or energy—issues that could be attributed to former manager Scott Servais, who was fired midseason.
After Servais’ departure, interim manager Dan Wilson guided the team to a strong finish, going 8-2 in their final 10 games. But this late surge came too late, largely due to easier matchups against injury-riddled and last-place teams. The question remains: should the Mariners have made the managerial change sooner?
Perhaps the most painful moment of the season came on June 7 in Kansas City. The Mariners led the Royals 8-0 after the first inning and still held a 9-7 lead heading into the bottom of the ninth. A walk, a throwing error by Josh Rojas, and a triple by Bobby Witt Jr. erased that lead, and the Royals walked it off with a fielder’s choice. If the Mariners had held on to that win, they would have secured 86 victories—enough to clinch a playoff berth.
Ultimately, the Mariners’ 2024 season can’t be chalked up to bad luck alone. Despite their statistical strengths, they were plagued by strikeouts, inconsistent offense, and a philosophy that backfired. Yet, the fact that they were so close to the playoffs highlights their talent and potential.
It will be a long offseason for Mariners fans, but if the organization makes the right moves and addresses these issues, their talented core may finally get them back into the postseason.
For years, the Mariners suffered from a combination of poor coaching, bad trades, and mismanagement of prospects and finances. This led to a 20-year playoff drought from 2002 to 2021. However, hope had returned. The streak was broken in 2022, and by 2024, the Mariners appeared poised for success with a roster full of stars.
Scott Servais, who had received Manager of the Year votes in 2022, remained at the helm, signaling consistency and leadership. The front office made several bold moves, trading for 2B Jorge Polanco, RP Gregory Santos, and OF Luke Raley—moves that were widely praised. They also acquired DH/C Mitch Garver, fresh off a World Series victory with the Rangers, while offloading bad contracts like those of Robbie Ray and Marco Gonzales.
At the heart of the Mariners’ optimism was their young core: Julio Rodriguez, George Kirby, Logan Gilbert, Cal Raleigh, Bryce Miller, Bryan Woo, Andres Munoz, and JP Crawford—players who had grown into stars under the team’s development system. The balance seemed right: young talent, veteran leadership (Mitch Haniger, Luis Castillo, Ryne Stanek), and breakout candidates like Woo, Miller, and Dominic Canzone. Role players like Dylan Moore, Tayler Saucedo, and Josh Rojas added depth to a promising roster.
Despite all these ingredients, the Mariners fell short of expectations. They finished with an 85-77 record—a fourth consecutive winning season, an unprecedented feat in franchise history—but it felt like a hollow achievement. For the 22nd time in 23 seasons, the Mariners missed the playoffs.
So, what went wrong?
Statistically, the Mariners were not a bad team in 2024. They ranked among the top 10 teams in baseball by many metrics. They led the MLB in team ERA at 3.49 and ranked 12th in wRC+ (a stat adjusting for ballpark effects and measuring total offensive production). Their run differential of +69 suggested they should have finished with a better record—an expected 89-73 mark, which would have secured them a playoff spot.
But two key statistics told a different story: batting average and strikeout percentage. The Mariners ranked 29th in batting average with a dismal .224, only slightly better than the White Sox. Modern analytics downplay batting average in favor of metrics like home runs and walks, but getting hits still matters. The Mariners walked often (fourth-most in the league), but they struggled to turn those walks into extra bases, ranking 27th in doubles and 29th in triples.
Strikeouts were an even bigger issue. Seattle struck out 26.8% of the time, tying the Rockies for the highest K% in baseball. The Mariners’ offensive philosophy of “controlling the zone” seemed to backfire. While this approach worked well for their pitchers, it led to excessive caution at the plate. Seattle hitters often watched strikes go by, leading the league in strikeouts looking. Instead of making contact or fouling off close pitches, they found themselves falling behind in the count, making it harder to recover in at-bats.
This passive approach was particularly costly in critical moments. The Mariners struggled with situational hitting—advancing runners and producing outs that moved runners into scoring position. This failure was magnified in close games, where Seattle often lost by just one run. Their inability to play “small ball” and capitalize on opportunities was a major factor in their underperformance.
Inconsistent offensive production was another problem. While the Mariners could score in bursts—blowing out opponents with eight-plus runs in some games—they often followed these outbursts with multiple low-scoring losses. This feast-or-famine offense made it difficult for them to win series consistently, even if they outscored their opponents overall.
Day games and matchups against weaker opponents also proved to be their undoing. Seattle lost eight games to the lowly Angels and dropped series to other sub-.500 teams like the Marlins, Athletics, and Nationals. They were 5-1 against the Tigers, who edged them out for the final playoff spot in the American League. These losses may reflect a lack of motivation or energy—issues that could be attributed to former manager Scott Servais, who was fired midseason.
After Servais’ departure, interim manager Dan Wilson guided the team to a strong finish, going 8-2 in their final 10 games. But this late surge came too late, largely due to easier matchups against injury-riddled and last-place teams. The question remains: should the Mariners have made the managerial change sooner?
Perhaps the most painful moment of the season came on June 7 in Kansas City. The Mariners led the Royals 8-0 after the first inning and still held a 9-7 lead heading into the bottom of the ninth. A walk, a throwing error by Josh Rojas, and a triple by Bobby Witt Jr. erased that lead, and the Royals walked it off with a fielder’s choice. If the Mariners had held on to that win, they would have secured 86 victories—enough to clinch a playoff berth.
Ultimately, the Mariners’ 2024 season can’t be chalked up to bad luck alone. Despite their statistical strengths, they were plagued by strikeouts, inconsistent offense, and a philosophy that backfired. Yet, the fact that they were so close to the playoffs highlights their talent and potential.
It will be a long offseason for Mariners fans, but if the organization makes the right moves and addresses these issues, their talented core may finally get them back into the postseason.